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Abstract
Why do parties and candidates decide to go negative? Research usually starts from the assumption that this decision is
strategic, and within this framework two elements stand out: the prospect of electoral failure increases the use of neg-
ative campaigning, and so does time pressure (little reaming time to convince voters before election day). In this article,
we contribute to this framework by testing two new expectations: (i) political actors are more likely to go negative when
they face unfavourable competitive standings and voting day is near; and (ii) they are less likely to go negative when they
faced a substantive degradation in their competitive standing over the course of the campaign.We test these expectations
on a rich database of newspaper ads about national referenda in Switzerland and provide preliminary empirical evidence
consistent with those expectations. The results have important implications for existing research on the strategic under-
pinnings of campaigning and political communication.
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1. Introduction
Negative campaigning—that is, the use of messages in-
tended to attack political rivals instead of promoting
one’s own ideas and record—matters. Existing evidence
suggests that the use of attacks during election cam-
paigns have a wide range of effects, for instance on vot-
ers’ information memorability and information search
(Lau, 1982; Lau & Redlawsk, 2015), election outcomes
(Lau & Pomper, 2004), turnout (Ansolabehere & Iyengar,
1995; Nai, 2013), support and affect for the attacker and
the sponsor (Banda &Windett, 2016), issue ambivalence
and vote consistency (Lanz & Nai, 2015; Nai, 2014), polit-
ical “mood” and cynicism (Yoon, Pinkleton, & Ko, 2005),
and so forth. Research on what drives parties and can-
didates to “go negative” also has flourished in recent
years (Nai & Walter, 2015). This research starts from the
assumption that the decision for competing parties to
attack their rivals is strategic, and that threy operate a
trade-off between benefits (e.g., degraded evaluation of
the opponent in the eyes of the voters, or reduced mobi-
lization of undecided voters potentially in favour of the
opponent) and costs (potential “backlash” effects, such
as reduction in support for the sponsor in the eyes of the
voter, as these latter usually dislike negative messages).
In decidingwhether to go negative, two elements are
particularly relevant: the competitive standing of actors,
that is, if they are facing the prospect of electoral failure
(or are instead ahead in the race); and the advertisement
timing, that is, how much time is left before election
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day. Existing literature shows that unfavourable stand-
ings drive the use of attacks (e.g., Skaperdas & Grofman,
1995; Walter, van der Brug, & van Praag, 2014). Strong
evidence also exists that as the election day draws near,
the frequency of negative messages increases substan-
tially (e.g., Freedman&Goldstein, 2002; Haynes & Rhine,
1998; Ridout & Holland, 2010). We still, however, lack
systematic evidence about how these two major drivers
interact and, more specifically, about how the dynamics
of competitive standings affect the use of attack mes-
sages (however see Blackwell, 2013). Do unfavourable
competitive standings create even stronger incentives to
go negative at the end of the campaign? And what hap-
pens when a party faces a substantive loss of popular
support over the campaign? With this in mind, we dis-
cuss and test two new expectations: 1) political actors
are more likely to go negative when they are lagging be-
hind in the polls and election day is near (frantic loser hy-
pothesis); and 2) political actors are less likely to go neg-
ative when they faced a substantive degradation in their
competitive standing over the course of the campaign
(anxiety hypothesis). Do competing candidates “plan all
of their rallies, write all of their speeches, and film all
of their advertisements at the beginning of a campaign,
then sit back and watch them unfold until Election Day?
Clearly this is absurd” (Blackwell, 2013, p. 504).
Our article contributes to the emerging literature
assessing the dynamics of election campaigns, starting
from the assumption that competing parties and candi-
dates adjust their strategies based on the evolution of
the information they are exposed to.
We test our dynamic expectations on a rich database
of campaign ads published in newspapers before fed-
eral referenda in Switzerland between 1999 and 2012.
Comparing with the USA, undoubtedly the most studied
case when it comes to negative campaigning, trends for
Switzerland will probably represent a conservative esti-
mate. Referenda are different than elections, as compe-
tition is not between opposing candidates but between
camps supporting opposing policy proposals. This, as we
argued elseqhere (Nai, 2013), probablymakes that “char-
acter assasinations” are less frequent than in (first-past-
the-post) elections. Second, Swiss election campaigns
are still not fully professionalized, nor “Americanized”
(Marquis & Bergman, 2009); Swiss campaigns rarely rely
on consultants, spin-doctors or opposition research tech-
niques, which have been shown to increase the use
of negative advertising (Geer, 2012). Third, culturally,
whereas in the USA negativity is endemic to the politi-
cal game, in Switzerland political attacks are decidedly
less frequent and at odds with the deep-rooted tradition
of consensual agreements and cordial decision-making
and governance (but see Hänggli & Häusermann, 2015).
Fourth, voting via postal ballots in the weeks before
the election is very common in Swiss referenda, which
implies that a non-negligible share of the electorate is
de facto uninfluenced by campaign dynamics because
they already voted. Nonetheless, the share of undecided
voters making up their minds at the very last minute—
who have been shown to be particularly affected by
election campaigns (Nai & Walter, 2015)—is still impor-
tant, and thus there is no reason to believe that cam-
paign dynamics should not play a major role in Switzer-
land as well, albeit probably a subdued one in interna-
tional comparison. Indeed, we are not the first to have
studied campaign dynamics in Swiss referenda. For in-
stance, evidence exists that intense referendum cam-
paigns increase the interest and mobilization of voters
(Kriesi, 2005; Marquis & Bergman, 2009) and are more
likely to affect voting choices (Sciarini & Tresch, 2011);
at the same time, campaigns are able to alter the na-
ture of themedia debate, as the content ofmedia frames
about the referenda tends to reflect issue framing by the
campaigns (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010). More recently, some
studies have assessed more specifically the use of neg-
ative campaigning techniques in Swiss referendum cam-
paigns (e.g., Bernhard, 2012; Lanz &Nai, 2015; Nai, 2013,
2014, 2015; Nai & Sciarini, 2018). However, to the best of
our knowledge, this article is the first attempt at studying
the dynamics of competitive standing in polls and use of
negative campaigning during referenda, in Switzerland
and elsewhere.
Political attacks can broadly be classified into two
main types: person-based and policy-based attacks (e.g.,
Benoit, 1999; Lau & Pomper, 2004). Policy attacks focus
on the shortcomings of the opponents’ program, record
or policy propositions, whereas character attacks focus
on the opponents themselves—their persona, charac-
ter, profile, and even physical attributes (“ad hominem
attacks”). In this article we focus on character attacks,
for two reasons. First, from a logistical standpoint, it
makes little sense to study the presence and effects of
policy attacks in a direct-democratic setting; the very
nature of referendum campaigns is all about criticizing
policy propositions of the opposing camp (Nai, 2013).
Second, from a theoretical standpoint, personal attacks
are more likely to generate backlash effects (Budesheim,
Houston, & DePaola, 1996; Carraro & Castelli, 2010),
probably because citizens dislike them even more than
policy attacks (e.g., Fridkin & Kenney, 2011; Nai &Walter,
2015). Thus, personal attacks potentially provide a fertile
ground to test our new hypotheses, which all start form
the premise that actors strategically assess the chances
of a potential backlash before going negative.
2. Competitive Standing, Advertisement Timing, and
the Chances to Go Negative
Why do parties and candidates decide to run negative
campaigns? Modern campaigns are supported by a pro-
fessional apparatus. It relies on public opinions consul-
tants, internally-run opinion polling, media consultants,
research and analysis divisions, fundraising consultants,
opposition research to uncover dirty business of oppo-
nents and disliked candidates, multimedia consultants,
social media specialists, and so forth (see, e.g., Plasser,
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2000). This creates a situation in which the decision to
“go negative” is by all likelihood a strategic one, and po-
litical actors weigh uncertain benefits against potential
costs when deciding whether to attack their opponents
(Lau & Pomper, 2004). On the benefits side, political ac-
tors “go negative” in an attempt to attract undecided
voters or to diminish positive feelings for opposing can-
didates or parties, thus indirectly increasing their popu-
lar support (Budesheim et al., 1996; Lau, Siegelman, &
Rovner, 2007). On the costs side, running excessively neg-
ative campaigns is considered to be a potentially danger-
ous strategy, as attacks are unpopular and generally dis-
liked by the public (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011). Thus, attack-
ers face the risk that thir messages will “backlash” and
generate negative feelings towards them instead of to-
wards the target (Garramone, 1984; Johnson-Cartee &
Copeland, 1991; Roese & Sande, 1993).
Within this strategic framework, two elements stand
out as particularly relevant: the competitive standing of
competitors, that is, if they are lagging behind or are
ahead in the race; and the advertisement timing, that is,
how much time in the campaign is left to attract voters
(or scare voters away from the opposite camp). First, the
competitive standing of parties and candidates (Haynes
& Rhine, 1998) is a good predictor for the chances they
will run negative campaigns. Pre-election polls are a cen-
tral component of the “horserace” framing in political
journalism (e.g., Broh, 1980; Iyengar, Norpoth, & Hahn,
2004), but their direct effect on election results is still
debated. Some scholars argue that identifying a win-
ner in polls acts as a powerful heuristic to motivate un-
decided voters to support a candidate likely to win in
the election, thus not wasting their vote (bandwagon ef-
fect; Marsh, 1985), in which cases opinion polls can be
seen as “self-fulfilling prophecies” (Rothschild & Malho-
tra, 2014); others argue instead that polls can provide a
boost for the loser, as people tend to like “underdogs”
(Vandello, Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007). Whatever
their direct effect on voters, it is incontestable that pre-
election polls provide vital information to campaigners to
(re)shape their communication strategies. The prospect
of electoral failure has been shown to trigger incentives
for attack politics (Harrington & Hess, 1996; Skaperdas
& Grofman, 1995; Walter et al., 2014). Positive cam-
paigning is principally used to attract and entice vot-
ers, whereas:
Negative campaigning is used to reduce the support
of the opponent…[Thus], the one lagging behind in
the polls has not succeeded in attracting undecided
voters and, therefore, has to scare off the opponent’s
voters to stand a better chance. (Elmelund-Præstekær,
2010, p. 141)
In addition, actors lagging behind have little to lose—and
much to gain—from a negative strategy. They are, there-
fore, more willing the bear the risk of “backlash effect”,
i.e., the risk that negative campaigning might “scare off”
voters in the attacker camp (Brooks & Murov, 2012;
Walter, 2012). By contrast, actors who are expected to
succeed are less likely to rely on negative campaigning:
As potential winners they feel much more concerned by
the possible backlash effect; for them, the cost-benefit
calculation should result in a risk-adverse strategy.
Second, the advertisement timing is also a good
predictor of the tone of the campaign: as the election
day draws near, the frequency of negative messages is
likely to increase (Damore, 2002; Haynes & Rhine, 1998;
Freedman & Goldstein, 2002; Ridout & Holland, 2010).
The rationale for this is threefold. First, parties and candi-
dates run campaigns to inform voters about their propo-
sitions, which should strategically come first:
At the outset of a campaign, it may be more effec-
tive for candidates to provide voters with information
about who they are and what issues are important to
them. If candidates attack early, they are unable to
define themselves to voters because all they are com-
municating is negative information about their oppo-
nents. (Damore, 2002, p. 672)
In this sense, attacks are more likely to appear towards
the end of the campaign, in order to increase voters’ sup-
port once they are saturated with positive information
(Damore, 2002; Elmelund-Præstekær, 2011; Peterson &
Djupe, 2005). Second, as a consequence of the first ra-
tionale, negative campaigning should be more effective
when the parties and candidates are considered credible
on the issues at stake. Thus, “by waiting to go negative
until after they have established themselves in the mind
of voters, candidates may be perceived as more cred-
ible, which may increase the veracity of their attacks”
(Damore, 2002, p. 673). Third, late negativity could be
especially efficient to capture the attention of the batch
of voters who make up their mind at the very last mo-
ment.Many undecided voters wait until the lastmoment
to make a decision vote, and negative campaigns have
been shown to be particularly effective on undecided
voters. Recent research has confirmed that these dynam-
ics also exist in direct democratic contests (Nai & Sciarini,
2018). Thus:
Hypothesis 1: Unfavourable competitive standings in-
crease the use of negative advertising.
Hypothesis 2: Little remaining time before the vote in-
creases the use of negative advertising.
3. The Dynamic Effects of Competitive Standing and
Advertisement Timing: Two New Expectations
The strategic relevance of losing in the polls and time
pressure for the use of negative campaigning is backedby
strong scientific evidence across different countries, elec-
toral systems, and types of contests. However, the ex-
isting literature usually relies on static causal inferences
where the determinants and the decision to go nega-
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tive are measured at a single point in time (however see
Blackwell, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, no exist-
ing study has been able to show that the strategic deci-
sions of going negative as a result of a negative competi-
tive standing (i.e., losing in the polls) has a dynamic com-
ponent and is a function of the advertisement timing.
In this article, we propose and test two new expecta-
tions about the dynamics between advertisement timing
and anunfavourable competitive standing: i) the reinforc-
ing interaction between competitive standing and adver-
tisement timing; and ii) the effect of a negative evolution
of competitive standing over time. Our overall argument
can be summarize as follows: during the course of the
campaign, competing actors are more likely to go nega-
tive when they are lagging behind in the polls and elec-
tion day is close (frantic loser hypothesis). This should al-
ways be the case, unless they faced a substantive loss in
poll support; in such a case, we argue that the anxiety re-
sulting in being confrontedwith aworsening competitive
standing makes them adopt a more risk-free approach
(anxiety hypothesis). We disentangle these two new hy-
potheses below.
First, we expect unfavourable competitive standing to
play an even greater role when time is running out. Ice
hockey games provide a good example for this; as per
standard regulations, each competing team can, at any
time during the game, “pull the goalie” (i.e., remove that
player from the ice) in exchange for an extra attack player.
In doing so, the team sacrifices defence over offense: they
increase their chances to score, but face at the same time
a greater risk as they are, after all, playing with a defence-
less net. This scenario, quite frequent in USA and Euro-
pean competitions, is a good example for us here because
this “reckless” strategy is usually implemented (i) by the
losing team, and (ii) at the end of the game. Another rea-
son why the scenario is a good fit for our case is that
sport teams and electoral campaigns have in common
highly professionalizedmanagers. In both cases, strategic
considerations based on risk-averse principles are likely
to guide future actions. In both cases, those who make
these decisions face a changing environment and have to
adapt their strategies. Both are aware of the advantages
and risks of more aggressive strategies. Thus, it should
come as no surprise that riskier strategies are undertaken
by losers only when no other solution exists. This should
incite, strategically, to go negative only as a means of last
resort, and especially when risks of backlash are irrele-
vant because of an already negative standing. Thus:
Hypothesis 3: Negative advertising is especially likely
in case of unfavourable competitive standings at the
end of the campaign (frantic loser hypothesis).
Second, what happens as the competitive standing of
parties and candidates evolves over time? More specif-
ically, is the use of negative advertising influenced by un-
favourable new polls? As for the frantic loser hypothe-
sis (H3), this second dynamic also takes into account the
interaction between competitive standing and advertise-
ment timing. In this case, we expect an effect of an un-
favourable evolution in the polls during the campaign.
More specifically, we expect that losing support in the
polls over the course of the campaign has a detrimen-
tal effect on the use of negative campaigning. The ratio-
nale for such expectation comes from the emotional ef-
fects of new and surprising information on decision mak-
ing and, more generally, social and political behaviour.
The Affective Intelligence Model (Marcus, 2002; Marcus
&MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000),
on which we base our assumptions, describes two fun-
damental emotional systems that work in parallel, de-
pending on the specific situation that individuals are
confronted with (MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, & Keele,
2007). First, the disposition system “generates enthusi-
asm/satisfaction or depression/frustration as incoming
information reports that the execution of one’s plans ei-
ther matches or does not match expectations (or suc-
cess)” (Brader, 2006, p. 60).
Second, the surveillance system “generates anxi-
ety/unease or relaxation/calm as incoming information
suggests it is either safe or potentially unsafe to go about
one’s business as usual” (Brader, 2006, p. 60). The surveil-
lance system is activated when individuals face new and
surprising information, which directly generates unease
and anxiety. In our case, this should happen when po-
litical actors face a drastic drop in their popular support
expressed in pre-electoral polls.
The effects of anxiety on decision-making are largely
known: anxiety triggers more careful behaviors, thus po-
tentially reducing the use of aggressive campaign tech-
niques. Anxiety “causes individuals to become more
aware of their surroundings, in particular, novel or
threatening circumstances [and] stimulates a desire to
more fully understand and analyze the source of a po-
tential threat” (Steenbergen & Ellis, 2006, p. 111). Even
more important for our purpose is that anxiety has
been shown to increase risk perception and risk aver-
sion (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Lerner &
Keltner, 2001). Anxiety might produce “a sense of un-
certainty and lack of control that elevates future judg-
ments of risk […while also increasing] perceived risk be-
cause it heightens the salience of self-relevant negative
thoughts” (Huddy et al., 2005, p. 595). If new and threat-
ening information leads to anxiety, and if anxiety leads to
a higher chance of adopting risk-averse strategies, then
it seems logical to expect that actors who face a dras-
tic loss in public support are more likely to be afraid
of backlash effects, thus perhaps thinking twice before
going negative. This should be a function of the magni-
tude of the support lost between polls: the higher the
support lost, the higher the anxiety felt, thus the higher
the chances of adopting risk-averse strategies, and the
lower the chances of going negative. Of course, polling
results are subject to a great deal of interpretation when
it comes to anticipating a final outcomebased from them.
Furthermore, it is a well-known phenomenon in Swiss
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referenda that many proposals (especially popular initia-
tives) are affected by a steady erosion of support over the
course of the campaign—which is undoubtedly some-
thing that campaigners are aware of and are able to antic-
ipate. Nonetheless, we believe that an argument can be
made that even with this in mind campaigners are never
shielded from negative surprises when it comes to com-
petitive standings, and that facing a sudden drop in sup-
port is very likely to affect the strategic considerations
about the content of campaign messages. Thus:
Hypothesis 4: A negative evolution in competitive
standings leads to lower chances of using negative
advertising over the course of the campaign (anxiety
hypothesis).
It is important to note that we assume the evolution of
competitive standing (H4) as having more profound ef-
fects than the interaction between losing and timing (H3).
Parties and candidates whose competitive standing de-
teriorates should be less likely to go negative even when
they are losing in the polls and time is running out. The lit-
erature highlighting the prevalence of emotional reason-
ing over rational and conscious reasoning provides the
argument. Emotional experiences (in our case, anxiety)
have a structuring effect on cognitive processes (in our
case, the decision to go negative or not; Damasio, 1994).
“[T]he weight of opinion in psychology has shifted to a
view that these unconscious evaluations are far more ac-
tive, and hence far more important, than conscious cog-
nitive processing” (Marcus, 2000, p. 231). Especially dur-
ing decision-making processes, affective evaluations and
cognitive processes are two sides of a same process (Nai,
Schemeil, & Marie, 2017), and rational thinking depends
on prior emotional evaluations. In other words, under-
lying emotions are more important than higher rational
reasoning. The two new hypotheses can thus be artic-
ulated as follows: actors are more likely to go negative
when they are lagging behind in the polls and voting day
is near (H3), unless they faced a substantive degradation
in their competitive standing over the course of the cam-
paign, in which case they are less likely to go negative,
ceteris paribus (H4).
4. Data and Measures
Political commercials on TV and radio are banned
in Switzerland. Although political commercials can be
broadcasted elsewhere (e.g., in cinemas and online) the
culture of campaigning in Switzerland leads to parties
and candidates usually not relying on those type of ad-
vertising in elections or referenda. In this context, news-
papers ads are virtually the only option for political ac-
tors to campaign through mass media and are one of
the most important campaign instruments for political
parties and interest groups, as well as one of the main
sources of information for Swiss voters (Kriesi, 2006). In
addition, newspaper ads are a reliable indicator of the
intensity, direction, and frame of direct democratic cam-
paigns in Switzerland (Nai, 2013; Sciarini & Tresch, 2011).
In this article we rely on a comprehensive database of all
campaign ads published in six Swiss newspapers for all
national referenda that have taken place in Switzerland
between 1999 and 2012, which includes 121 legal or con-
stitutional amendments (see full list in Appendix). We se-
lected sixmajor Swiss newspapers: Tribune deGenève, Le
Temps (French), Neue-Zürcher Zeitung, Tages-Anzeiger
(German), Regione, and Giornale del Popolo (Italian).
Given the fragmentation of Swissmediamarket along dis-
tinct linguistic regions, two newspapers for each of the
three main languages were selected. These newspapers
are approximately representative of themain ideological
cleavages in each linguistic region (e.g., for the Italian-
speaking region the Regione has a center-left editorial
line, whereas the Giornale del Popolo is usually consid-
ered to be center-right). For these newspapers we col-
lected and content-coded all ads published over the four
weeks before each vote between 1999 and 2012. We col-
lected and coded more than 10,000 ads, each of them
recommending either supporting or rejecting the amend-
ments. Due to missing data for pre-ballot polls (see be-
low), our analyses are run on a subsample of 67 ref-
erenda, for which approximately 7,000 newspaper ads
were identified. A manual coding of all ads was under-
taken, where we identified for each ad the use of “nega-
tive” messages where the ad sponsor explicitly criticized
their opponents. If one or more of such attacks were
present, the ad was qualified as “negative” (Nai, 2013;
Nai & Sciarini, 2018). The dependent variable is thus bi-
nary, where 1measures the presence of one ormore per-
sonal attack(s) in the ad. Table A1 in the Appendix lists
the percentage of ads with personal attacks for each ref-
erendum in our database.
We use representative pre-ballot polls to evaluate
the competitive standing of actors (Haynes & Rhine,
1998). For this, we rely on the polls conducted by the
Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (Schweizerische Radio-
und Fernsehgesellschaft, henceforth SRG) the most im-
portant and widely-circulated poll for referenda in
Switzerland. The data are gathered though surveys on
random samples of Swiss citizens (see Nai & Sciarini,
2018). The SRG polls are conducted twice before each
vote: national trends for the first survey are published
six weeks before the vote, whereas trends for the sec-
ond survey are published two weeks before the vote.
Based on these trends, we measure competitive stand-
ing comparing the relative support for the “yes” and
“no” camps (undecided voters are excluded); ads sup-
porting the camp with the lowest relative score are clas-
sified as being in the losing camp, and whereas ads with
the higher relative share of support in polls are coded
as being in the winning camp. Based on the two polls,
three variables are created: the first measures competi-
tive standing for the first poll (six weeks before the vote),
the second measures competitive standing for the sec-
ond survey (two weeks before the vote), and the third
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measures the average competitive standing during the
whole campaign (average for both surveys).
Furthermore, comparing the two surveys allows us to
measure the evolution of competitive standing. By sub-
tracting for any given camp the share of support in the
second survey from the share of support in the first sur-
vey, we have a direct measure of the relative loss (or
gain) in support during the campaign. As an example, the
“yes” camp during the popular initiative “For democratic
naturalisations”, launched by the far-right Swiss People’s
Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, henceforth SVP) and
voted in June 2008, was supported by 48% of voters in
the first survey (thus being virtually in the winning camp,
if we take into account that 15% of voters were still un-
decided), but only supported by 33% of voters in the sec-
ond survey, two weeks before the vote. The “yes” camp
for that initiative thus lost 15% between the two surveys
(48–33%) and was virtually the losing camp after the sec-
ond survey.
SRG pre-ballot polls are available only for a subset of
votes. Over the 121 referenda voted on in Switzerland be-
tween 1999 and 2012, SRG polls are available only for 69;
furthermore, for six votes out of those 69 only the first
survey wave (six weeks before the vote) is available. Our
analyses will be run only on the subsets of referenda for
which pre-ballot polls are available. The Appendix speci-
fies for which referenda the SRG poll data are available.
Based on the day the ad was published in press we
can calculate the time remaining between the publica-
tion of the ad and the voting day; in our models, we use
a variable that differentiates between the week in which
the adwas published (either first, second, third, or fourth
and last week of the campaign), which provides a valid
proxy of the time pressure the actors are facing when
publishing their ads. This variable, in conjunction with
the variable measuring competitive standings (losing in
the polls) will be used to test for our new H3. The timing
of the different data sources used in the article is illus-
trated in Figure 1. As the figure shows, the first SRG sur-
vey (6 weeks before the vote) establishes the benchmark
in terms ofwinners and losers used during the first half of
the “campaign”measured in our newspaper ads data;we
assume that the decision to go “negative” during the first
half of the campaign is driven by the knowledge of com-
petitive standings (that is, who is ahead and which camp
is lagging behind) provided by this first survey. Half-way
during this “campaign”, two weeks prior to the vote, the
second SRG survey changes the dynamics by re-assessing
who the frontrunners (potential winners) and losers are
at that specific point in time. It is the change between
the two surveys, two weeks before the vote, that drives
most of the dynamics of (negative) campaigning studied
in this article.
Our models include several controls intended to take
into account the specific nature of (Swiss) referenda, as
well as additional dimensions of the “race”. First, we
control for the direction of the ad (i.e., whether the
ad supports the “yes” or the “no” camp), which has
been shown to partially affect the use of negative ad-
vertising (Nai, 2013), and include a variable that discrim-
inates between popular initiatives—bottom-up instru-
ments through which any group can put any issue on the
political agenda, and which usually generate more nega-
tive campaigns and are less successful (Nai, 2013)—and
referendums, called in reaction to an amendment of the
law or Constitution by the elites. Controlling for these
two factors simultaneously allows us to also control, in-
directly, for whether the actor is part of the “challenger”
coalition—i.e., endorsing the “no” camp in a popular ini-
tiative implies endorsing the camp promoting the status
quo against the constitutional challenge. Furthermore,
ourmodels control for the presence of personal endorse-
ments of the ad (i.e., whether or not the ad is explicitly
endorsed by a public figure, such a politician); good rea-
sons exist to expect anonymous (i.e., not personally en-
dorsed) ads to be more negative, as anonymity uncou-
ples the attacker from potential backlash effects (Brooks
& Murov, 2012; Nai & Sciarini, 2018). Finally, our mod-
els control also for the referendum issue (domestic v. for-
eign policy), and for overall turnout; the latter is intended
as proxy of general saliency of the vote and indirectly con-
trols for the fact that negativity could naturally be higher
when the public perceives that the issues at stake are
important (which usually translates into higher turnout).
Descriptive statistics for all variables in our models are
presented in Table 1.
6Weeks before
the vote
5 4 3 2 1 vote
SRG
survey 1
SRG
survey 2
Campaign data
(newspaper ads)
Figure 1. Data and timing of the vote.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Personal attacks in ad a 6,741 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Losing in polls b 6,741 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Total support lost b 5,718 −0.02 0.08 -0.28 0.23
Week a 6,741 2.62 1.05 1.00 4.00
Explicit endorsement in ad a 6,741 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Ad supports YES vote a 6,741 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Popular initiative a 6,741 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Turnout a 6,741 47.04 5.81 35.84 58.43
Foreign policy issue a 6,741 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Notes: a Own dataset. b SRG survey results; gfs.bern.
5. Analyses and Results
Our data have a hierarchical structure, where ads are
nested within specific referenda. We thus rely on two-
levelmodels where the likelihood to use personal attacks
in any given ad (our dependent variable) is regressed on
determinants at both the ad and context levels. As the
dependent variable is binary we use hierarchical gener-
alized linear models with logit transformations.
Our models are able to go beyond the problem of
“single-shot” causal inference, biased because causes
and actions are measured in a given single time-point
(Blackwell, 2013, p. 505). We take into account the fact
that surveys are made public before the publication of
ads in newspapers (thus ensuring that the time causality
is respected through a naturally lagged independent vari-
able). We are not interested in the effect of negative ad-
vertising on election results (or on the evolution of com-
petitive standings during the campaign), but on the rea-
sons why actors decide to go negative. Thus, our mod-
els should not excessively suffer from posttreatment bias
(i.e., the fact that negativity in earlier phases of the cam-
paignmight influence poll results; Blackwell, 2013). Even
assuming the worst case scenario in which this happens
massively (poll results during the campaign are strongly
driven by previous campaign tone), the subsequent be-
haviour of actors should not be dramatically affected for
two reasons: i) actors are not aware if the evolution in
polls is due to their previous campaign strategies and
thus their behaviour should not be endogenously biased;
and ii) referendum campaigns are made up of a multi-
tude of different actors, unlike electoral races, and thus
the causal link between any given ad and subsequent poll
results for the side they support (yes vs. no) is tenuous
at best.
Table 2 shows, first, that the prospect of electoral
failure and advertisement timing significantly affect the
use of negative advertising. The direct effect of losing
in the poll is quite strong, and significantly positive at
p < .001 (M1). Ceteris paribus, facing a negative com-
petitive standing uncouples parties from the Damocles’
sword of potential backlash effects, which increases the
appeal of negative advertising. This confirms trends in
the USA and beyond (e.g., Damore, 2002; Elmelund-
Præstekær, 2010; Harrington & Hess, 1996; Skaperdas &
Grofman, 1995; Walter et al., 2014).
Also, ceteris paribus, when election day draws near
political ads aremore likely to go negative; ads published
during the last week are significantly more negative than
ads published during the first week of the campaign (ref-
erence category). This is in linewithwhat has been found
in several studies (e.g., Damore, 2002; Haynes & Rhine,
1998; Peterson & Djupe, 2005; Ridout & Holland, 2010).
The first model, thus, confirms the effects already known
in the literature concerning the direct effect of competi-
tive standing and advertisement timing (H1 andH2), thus
acting as initial benchmark for our additional hypotheses
(H3 and H4).
Model M2 presents a first test for the joint effect of
losing in the polls and advertisement timing, via an inter-
active term between the two. The interaction effect is
significant at p < .05, but its magnitude is quite small, as
substantiated in Figure 2 via marginal effects.
Models M3 and M4 present additional tests for the
joint effect of losing in the polls and advertisement tim-
ing. We expected that the simultaneous presence of un-
favourable polls and time pressure would trigger the
use of personal attacks even more substantively. We ex-
pected, in other terms, that losers tend to become frantic
when time is running out. Model M3 is run only on ads
published within the first two weeks of the campaigns
(respectively 4 and 3 weeks before the vote), and thus
published after the first SRG poll, but before the second.
We expect that ads published in this first half of the cam-
paign are affected by the first survey only. Model M4 is
very similar, but run only on ads published in the last two
weeks in the campaign (2 and 1 weeks before the vote),
and thus just after the second SRGpoll.Wemight thus ex-
pect that ads published in the last two weeks of the cam-
paigns are especially affected by results of this second
poll. Using another sport metaphor, one can think about
those two models as follows: M3 estimates a more ag-
gressive behaviour for the losing side during the first half
of the game; M4 estimates the same, but for the second
half of the game. The fact that models M3 and M4 are
run on subsamples of ads is the reason why these mod-
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Table 2. Use of personal attacks by competitive standing and advertisement timing.
Whole campaign First two weeks Last two weeks
of campaign of campaign
M1 M2 M3 M4
OR (Se) Sig OR (Se) Sig OR (Se) Sig OR (Se) Sig
Intercept 0.00 (0.01) ** 0.00 (0.01) ** 0.08 (0.21) 0.01 (0.01) **
Losing in polls 2.02 (0.27) *** 3.34 (9.92) ***
Losing in polls (survey 1)a 1.38 (0.36)
Losing in polls (survey 2)b 1.63 (0.27) **
Week c
— second 0.95 (0.14) 1.06 (0.16)
— third 1.16 (0.16) 1.46 (0.26) *
— fourth (and last) 1.34 (0.18) * 1.89 (0.41) **
Losing * week 0.83 (0.7) *
Endorsement 0.31 (0.04) *** 0.31 (0.04) *** 0.33 (0.07) *** 0.28 (0.05) ***
Ad supports YES vote 0.85 (0.11) 0.85 (0.11) 0.59 (0.15) * 0.81 (0.14)
Turnout 1.05 (0.04) 1.05 (0.04) 0.97 (0.06) 1.05 (0.04)
Popular initiative 1.84 (0.80) 1.82 (0.80) 3.33 (1.85) * 1.29 (0.49)
Foreign policy 2.72 (1.61) † 2.73 (1.62) † 5.18 (3.94) * 2.23 (1.07) †
Log Likelihood −1782 −1780 −729 −1032
Rho 0.40 (0.07) 0.40 (0.07) 0.45 (0.08) 0.28 (0.07)
N (ads) 6,741 6,741 2,956 3,211
N (projects voted) 67 67 65 58
N per group 3/100.6/327 3/100.6/327 1/45.5/161 2/55.4/193
(min/avg/max)
Notes: *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05, † p< 0.1. a Pre-ballot survey 1 published six weeks before voting day. b Pre-ballot survey 2
published two weeks before voting day. c Reference category is first week of campaign (4 weeks prior to voting day). Dependent variable
is the presence of negativism in the ad (binary variable), random effects logistic regressions run with Stata 14.1. Coefficients are odds
ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Model M1 run for ads published during the whole campaign (four weeks prior to voting day).
Model M2 run only for ads published during the first two weeks of the campaign (respectively four and three weeks prior to voting day).
Model M3 run only for ads published during the last two weeks of the campaign (respectively two and one weeks prior to voting day).
els have, comparatively, a smaller N. The twomodels pro-
vide evidence that suggests the presence of a joint effect
between competitive standing and advertisement timing
(H3). Even though in both cases the effect of losing in the
polls is positive, this effect is stronger and statistically
significant only in the last two weeks of the campaign
(modelM4). Themagnitude of this effect, comparedwith
the direct effect of losing in the polls, is substantiated
in Figure 3.
Table 3 introduces a new set of analyses. The rele-
vant variable measures howmuch support the camp has
lost between the two SRG polls (total support lost); pos-
itive values signal a loss between polls (decreasing pop-
ular support), and thus a net degradation in competitive
standings, whereas negative values signal a gain in popu-
lar support between polls.
We expected degradation in competitive standings—
that is, losing popular support over the duration of the
campaign—to decrease the likelihood of negative adver-
tising (H4). Our analyses provide preliminary support for
this expectation. When the difference between support
in poll 1 (six weeks before the vote) and poll 2 (twoweeks
before the vote) is positive—that is, when the actor
faces deteriorating polls—the probability of running ads
with personal attacks decreases significantly. The effect,
although positive and significant (as expected) is how-
ever not particularly strong, as substantiated in Figure 4
through marginal effects.
The final two models in Table 3 test for the same
effect, but by differentiating between ads published by
the winning camp (that is, the camp that is still winning
in the polls even after results of the second survey are
published; M6) and ads published by the losing camp
(M7) during the last week of the campaign only (which
explains the lower N overall in the models). The direc-
tion of the main results is as expected and are relatively
substantial, as illustrated in Figure 5 via marginal effects.
Ads published in the last week of the campaign by the
winning camp (top panel) are not substantially more neg-
ative when the camp lost support between polls. On the
other hand (bottom panel), the probability of running
ads with personal attacks decreases quite substantially
with increasing loss in poll support for the losing camp.
This supports our expectation that deteriorating polls
makes them more cautious and less likely to go negative
on their opponents (H4).
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Figure 2. Negative campaigning by losing in polls * week, marginal effects. Notes: Marginal effects with 95% confidence
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Figure 3. Standardized effects losing in the polls and advertisement timing. Notes: scores represent odds ratios for re-
gression models predicting the presence of personal attacks in ads. Coefficients for the whole campaign are from model
M1, coefficients for the first two weeks are from model M3, and coefficients for the last two weeks are from model M4
(Table 2). Coefficients for initiative and foreign policy not presented in the figure to simplify visualization, due to high
confidence intervals.
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Table 3. Use of personal attacks by evolution of competitive standing.
All ads Winning camp Losing camp
M4 M5 M6
OR (Se) Sig OR (Se) Sig OR (Se) Sig
Intercept 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.00 (0.00) *** 1.64 (3.39)
Total support losta 0.12 (0.08) ** 0.87 (2.56) 0.01 (0.01) †
Endorsement 0.18 (0.07) *** 0.73 (0.22)
Ad supports YES vote 0.90 (0.54) 2.07 (1.48)
Turnout 1.11 (0.05) ** 0.92 (0.04) †
Popular initiative 0.57 (0.26) 1.84 (1.03)
Foreign policy 0.84 (0.40) 10.06 (6.23) ***
Log Likelihood −1796 −214 −266
Rho 0.43 (0.07) 0.13 (0.08) 0.21 (0.12)
N (ads) 5,744 796 661
N (projects voted) 59 56 50
N per group (min/avg/max) 3/97.4/328 1/14.2/54 1/13.2/73
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. a Total support lost measures the difference in support between Survey 1 (six
weeks before the vote) and Survey 2 (two weeks before the vote). Thus, positive values mean that the camp lost support between Sur-
vey 1 and Survey 2, whereas negative values mean that the camp gained support between Survey 1 and Survey 2. Dependent variable
is the presence of negativism in the ad (binary variable), random effects logistic regressions run with Stata 14.1. Coefficients are odds
ratios, standard errors in parentheses. All models run only for ads published during the last week of the campaign (one week prior to
voting day).
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Figure 4. Negative campaigning by percentage of support lost between polls, marginal effects. Notes: Marginal effects
with 95% confidence intervals, based on coefficients in model M5 (Table 3). The grey bars represent the distribution of the
variable “absolute loss in poll support” (percentage histogram).
Our data does not, of course, allow us to test for the
underlying emotional components of such effects.Wedo
not have data that measure the emotional state of cam-
paign managers, nor do we know how they actually re-
acted to the publication of poll results; we do not know if
seeing a drop in poll support makes themmore attentive
to potential risks associated with more aggressive com-
munication strategies. We do not even know whomakes
the decision ultimately to go negative on the opponents.
The realm of strategic decisions of campaign consultants
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Figure 5. Negative campaigning by percentage of support lost between polls, marginal effects (winning vs. losing in polls).
(a)Winning in polls during week 4. (b) Losing in polls during week 4. Notes: marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals,
based on coefficients in model M6 (top panel) and M7 (bottom panel) of Table 3. All estimations computed for ads pub-
lished within the last week of the campaign; top panel presents estimations for ads published by the camp winning in the
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losing in the polls (regardless of evolution of poll support).
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and PR managers is, in our case, hidden inside the black
box of campaign strategies. All in all, our results can be
read as follows: Frontrunners do not go negative, espe-
cially not when they only have a little time left before the
vote (why would they, after all? They are already ahead
in the race and attack messages can be a risky business).
Underdogs, on the other hand, are more likely to go neg-
ative, especiallywhen they have nothing to lose (inwhich
case they “pull the goalie”). This asymmetry between
runners, that grows stronger as time to campaign runs
out, holds in most situations but one: when underdogs
see their position in the polls deteriorate drastically they
would rather not use personal attacks.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
It seems today undeniable that attack politics matter.
It is usually disliked by citizens, and might thus con-
tribute to some of the systemic illnesses of Western elec-
toral democracies, such as low turnout (Ansolabehere &
Iyengar, 1995) and increased cynicism (Yoon et al., 2005).
It might, on the other hand, increase citizens’ attention
(Geer, 2006; Lau & Redlawsk, 2015). Perhaps more im-
portantly, attacks have the potential of being electorally
consequential as they might reduce positive feelings for
the target (Banda &Windett, 2016; Nai & Seeberg, 2018;
Pinkleton, 1997). Within this framework, it is thus not a
surprise that most studies on the reasons to go negative
have focussed on the strategic underpinnings of such de-
cision, focussing on the trade-off between benefits (de-
creasing support and turnout for the opponent, discour-
aging undecided voters to turn out and vote for the op-
ponents, and ultimately win the race) and costs (poten-
tial “backlash” effects coming from voters usually dislik-
ing negativemessages). Two factors seem to stand out as
particularly relevant: the competitive standing of actors
and the advertisement timing. Existing literature rather
strongly agrees that the prospect of electoral failure in-
creases the use of negative advertising (e.g., Harrington
& Hess, 1996; Skaperdas & Grofman, 1995) and that the
frequency of negative messages seems to increase when
voting day looms (e.g., Freedman & Goldstein, 2002;
Ridout & Holland, 2010).
The existence of those dynamics was our starting
point. In this article, we studied campaign dynamics on
a particularly conservative case (Swiss referenda), but by
focussing on a particular type of campaignmessages that
are more likely to backfire and lower evaluation of the
sponsor: personal attacks (Budesheim et al., 1996). Our
preliminary goal was to confirm, for this specific case as
well, the known effects of competitive standing and ad-
vertisement timing. Our results show that, indeed, per-
sonal attacks are more likely when actors are lagging be-
hind in the polls and when voting day is close.
Beyond replicating these effects, however, our goal
was to advance our understanding about strategic dy-
namics by testing two new hypotheses, that we named
the frantic loser and the anxiety hypotheses. We pro-
vided preliminary support for these hypotheses. Our
analyses show that frontrunners go negative very rarely,
especially when they only have a little time to recover
from potential faux pas. On the other hand, underdogs
are sensibly more likely to go negative, especially when
they have nothing to lose and time to campaign runs
out. Our analyses also showed, in support of our anxi-
ety hypothesis, that when underdogs see their position
in the polls deteriorate they are less likely to use per-
sonal attacks.
We postulated that this effect might exist due to the
intervention of forces that go beyond (and beneath) pure
rationality and strategic reasoning: emotional states, in
this case anxiety experienced when facing drastic degra-
dation of competitive standings. Due to the nature of our
data, the intervening and moderating effect of emotions
is only postulated here. Our analyses do, however, pro-
vide evidence that supports this rationale. All in all, our
results suggest that a more encompassing approach is
needed for the study of the drivers of negativity: first, by
adding a dynamic component and acknowledging that
campaigns are highly volatile and evolving social phe-
nomena, and second by acknowledging that pure ratio-
nal thought and economic strategies are necessarily af-
fected by the underlying emotional states of those, hu-
mans after all, that face the decision whether or not
to run negative ads. Correlational effects such as those
described in this study should thus, as a next step, be
tested through sociological studies of actors involved
in strategic campaign decisions (e.g., Levenshus, 2010;
Plasser, 2000).
Acknowledgments
A previous version of this article has been presented at
the World Congress of the International Political Science
Association, Poznan, July 23–28 2016, in the panel
“Negative CampaigningAcross theWorld: Towards AGen-
eral Theory”. We are very grateful to all the participants
in the panel and to Dick Johnston, Jeff Karp, Pippa Norris,
and Felipe Borba for their precious inputs. All remaining
errors are of course our responsibility alone. Thank you
toGfs.bern for providing the SRGdata. AlessandroNai ac-
knowledges financial support from the SwissNational Sci-
ence Foundation (SNSF ref: 100017_137695) and logistic
support from the Electoral Integrity Project (University
of Sydney and Harvard). Many thanks also to Elizabeth
Young for valuable inputs and editing.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Ansolabehere, S., & Iyengar, S. (1995). Going negative:
How attack ads shrink and polarize the electorate.
New York, NY: Free Press.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 278–296 289
Banda, K. K., & Windett, J. H. (2016). Negative advertis-
ing and the dynamics of candidate support.	Political
Behavior,	38(3), 747–766.
Benoit, W. L. (1999). Seeing spots: A functional analy-
sis of presidential television advertisements from
1952–1996. New York, NY: Praeger.
Bernhard, L. (2012).	Campaign strategy in direct democ-
racy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Blackwell, M. (2013). A framework for dynamic causal in-
ference in political science. American Journal of Polit-
ical Science, 57(2), 504–520.
Brader, T. (2006). Campaigning for hearts and minds:
How emotional appeals in political adswork. Chicago,
MI: University of Chicago Press.
Broh, C. A. (1980). Horse-race journalism: Reporting the
polls in the 1976 presidential election.	Public Opinion
Quarterly,	44(4), 514–529.
Brooks, D. J., & Murov, M. (2012). Assessing accountabil-
ity in a post-Citizens United era: The effects of attack
ad sponsorship by unknown independent groups.
American Political Research, 40(3), 383–418.
Budesheim, T. L., Houston, D. A., & DePaola, S. G. (1996).
Persuasiveness of in-group and out-group political
messages: The case of negative campaigning. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(3), 523–534.
Carraro, L., & Castelli, L. (2010). The implicit and explicit
effects of negative political campaigns: Is the source
really blamed? Political Psychology, 31(4), 617–645.
Damasio, A. (1994), Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason,
and the human brain. New York, NY: Penguin.
Damore, D. F. (2002). Candidate strategy and the de-
cision to go negative. Political Research Quarterly,
55(3), 669–685.
Elmelund-Præstekær, C. (2010). Beyond American nega-
tivity: Toward a general understanding of the deter-
minants of negative campaigning. European Political
Science Review, 2(1), 137–156.
Elmelund-Præstekær, C. (2011). Issue ownership as a de-
terminant of negative campaigning. International Po-
litical Science Review, 32(2), 209–221.
Freedman, P., & Goldstein, K. (2002). Lessons learned
campaign advertising in the 2000 elections. Political
Communication, 19(1), 5–28.
Fridkin, K. L., & Kenney, P. J. (2011). Variability in citizens’
reactions to different types of negative campaigns.
American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 307–325.
Garramone, G. M. (1984). Voter response to negative po-
litical ads. Journalism Quarterly, 61(2), 250–259.
Geer, J. G. (2006). In defense of negativity: Attack ads
in presidential campaigns. Chicago, MI: University of
Chicago Press.
Geer, J. G. (2012). The news media and the rise of nega-
tivity in presidential campaigns. PS: Political Science
& Politics, 45(3), 422–427.
Hänggli, R., & Häusermann, S. (2015). Consensus lost?
Disenchanted democracy in Switzerland.	Swiss Politi-
cal Science Review,	21(4), 475–490.
Hänggli, R., & Kriesi, H. (2010). Political framing strate-
gies and their impact on media framing in a
Swiss direct-democratic campaign.	Political Commu-
nication,	27(2), 141–157.
Harrington, J., & Hess, G. (1996). A spatial theory of posi-
tive and negative campaigning.Games and Economic
Behavior, 17(2), 209–229.
Haynes, A. A., & Rhine, S. L. (1998). Attack politics in
presidential nomination campaigns: An examination
of the frequency and determinants of intermediated
negative messages against opponents. Political Re-
search Quarterly, 51(3), 691–721.
Huddy, L., Feldman, S., Taber, C., & Lahav, G. (2005).
Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies.
American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 593–608.
Iyengar, S., Norpoth, H., & Hahn, K. S. (2004). Consumer
demand for election news: The horserace sells.	The
Journal of Politics,	66(1), 157–175.
Johnson-Cartee, K. S., & Copeland, G. A. (1991). Nega-
tive political advertising: Coming of age. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Kriesi, H. (2005). Direct democratic choice. The Swiss ex-
perience. Oxford: Lexington Books.
Kriesi, H. (2006). Role of the political elite in Swiss direct-
democratic votes. Party Politics, 12(5), 599–622.
Lanz, S., & Nai, A. (2015). Vote as you think: Determi-
nants of consistent decision-making in direct democ-
racy. Swiss Political Science Review, 21(1), 119–139.
Lau, R. R. (1982). Negativity in political perception. Polit-
ical Behavior, 4(4), 353–377.
Lau, R. R., & Pomper, G. M. (2004). Negative campaign-
ing: An analysis of U.S. senate elections. Oxford: Row-
man and Littlefield.
Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2015). The effects of ad-
vertising tone on information processing and vote
choice. In A. Nai & A. S. Walter (Eds.), New perspec-
tives on negative campaigning: Why attack politics
matters (pp. 249–266). Colchester: ECPR Press.
Lau, R. R., Siegelman, L., & Rovner, I. B. (2007). The
effects of negative political campaigns: A meta-
analytic reassessment. The Journal of Politics, 69(4),
1176–1209.
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(1),
146–159.
Levenshus, A. (2010). Online relationship management
in a presidential campaign: A case study of the
Obama campaign’s management of its internet-
integrated grassroots effort. Journal of Public Rela-
tions Research, 22(3), 313–335.
MacKuen, M., Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & Keele, L.
(2007). The third way: The theory of affective intelli-
gence and American democracy. In R. Neuman, G. E.
Marcus, A. Crigler, &M. B.MacKuen (Eds.), The affect
effect. Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and
behavior (pp. 124–151). Chicago, MI: The University
of Chicago Press.
Marcus, G. E. (2000). Emotions in politics. Annual Review
of Political Science, 3(1), 221–250.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 278–296 290
Marcus, G. E. (2002). The sentimental citizen. Emotion in
democratic politics. University Park, PA: The Pennsyl-
vania State University.
Marcus, G. E., & MacKuen, M. B. (1993). Anxiety, en-
thusiasm, and the vote: The emotional underpin-
nings of learning and involvement during presidential
campaigns. American Political Science Review, 87(3),
672–685.
Marcus, G. E., Neuman, R., & MacKuen, M. B. (2000). Af-
fective intelligence and political judgement. Chicago,
MI: The University of Chicago Press.
Marquis, L., & Bergman, M. M. (2009). Development
and consequences of referendum campaigns in
Switzerland, 1981–1999.	Swiss Political Science Re-
view,	15(1), 63–97.
Marsh, C. (1985). Back on the bandwagon: The effect of
opinion polls on public opinion.	British Journal of Po-
litical Science,	15(1), 51–74.
Nai, A. (2013). What really matters is which camp goes
dirty. Differential effects of negative campaigning on
turnout during Swiss federal ballots. European Jour-
nal of Political Research, 52(1), 44–70.
Nai, A. (2014). The cadillac, the mother-in-law, and the
ballot: Individual and contextual roots of ambiva-
lence in Swiss direct democracy. Electoral Studies, 33,
292–306.
Nai, A. (2015). The maze and the mirror: Voting correctly
in direct democracy.	Social Science Quarterly,	96(2),
465–486.
Nai, A., & Sciarini, P. (2018). Why ‘going negative’?
Strategic and situational determinants of personal
attacks in Swiss direct democratic votes. Journal of
Political Marketing, 17(4). https://doi.org/10.1080/
15377857.2015.1058310
Nai, A., & Seeberg, H. B. (2018). A series of persua-
sive events. Sequencing effects of negative and pos-
itive messages on party evaluations and percep-
tions of negativity.	Journal of Marketing Communica-
tions,	24(4), 412–432.
Nai, A., Schemeil, Y., & Marie, J. L. (2017). Anxiety, so-
phistication, and resistance to persuasion: Evidence
from a quasi-experimental survey on global climate
change.	Political Psychology,	38(1), 137–156.
Nai, A., &Walter, A. S. (2015) (Eds.).New perspectives on
negative campaigning: Why attack politics matters.
Colchester: ECPR Press.
Peterson, D. A., & Djupe, P. A. (2005).When primary cam-
paigns go negative: The determinants of campaign
negativity. Political Research Quarterly, 58(1), 45–54.
Pinkleton, B. (1997). The effects of negative comparative
political advertising on candidate evaluations and ad-
vertising evaluations: An exploration.	Journal of Ad-
vertising,	26(1), 19–29.
Plasser, F. (2000). American campaign techniques
worldwide. The Harvard International Journal of
Press/Politics, 5(4), 33–54.
Ridout, T. N., & Holland, J. L. (2010). Candidate strate-
gies in the presidential nomination campaign. Presi-
dential Studies Quarterly, 40(4), 611–630.
Roese, N. J., & Sande, G. N. (1993). Backlash effects in
attack politics. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
23(8), 632–653.
Rothschild, D., & Malhotra, N. (2014). Are public
opinion polls self-fulfilling prophecies?	Research &
Politics,	1(2). https://doi.org/10.1177%2F20531680
14547667
Sciarini, P., & Tresch, A. (2011). Campaign effects in
direct-democratic votes in Switzerland. Journal of
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 21(3), 333–357.
Skaperdas, S., & Grofman, B. (1995). Modeling nega-
tive campaigning. American Political Science Review,
89(1), 49–61.
Steenbergen, M. R., & Ellis, C. (2006). Fear and loathing
in American elections: Context, traits, and negative
candidate affect. In D. P. Redlawsk (Ed.), Feeling pol-
itics. Emotion in political information processing (pp.
109–133). New York, NI: Palgrave.
Vandello, J. A., Goldschmied, N. P., & Richards, D. A.
(2007). The appeal of the underdog.	Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin,	33(12), 1603–1616.
Walter, A. S. (2012). Negative campaigning in Western
Europe. Beyond the vote-seeking perspective. Zut-
phen: Wöhrmann.
Walter, A. S., van der Brug, W., & van Praag, P. (2014).
When the stakes are high: Party competition and
negative campaigning. Comparative Political Studies,
47(4), 550–573.
Yoon, K., Pinkleton, B. E., & Ko, W. (2005). Effects of neg-
ative political advertising on voting intention: An ex-
ploration of the roles of involvement and source cred-
ibility in the development of voter cynicism. Journal
of Marketing Communications, 11(2), 95–112.
About the Authors
Alessandro Nai	is Assistant Professor of Political Communication and Journalism at the Department of
Communication Science, University of Amsterdam.His recentwork has been published in journals such
as	Political Psychology,	European Journal of Political Research,	West European Politics, Government
& Opposition, European Political Science, Personality and Individual Differences,	Presidential Studies
Quarterly, Electoral Studies, Journal of Political Marketing,	and	more. He recently co-edited the vol-
umes	NewPerspectives onNegative Campaigning:WhyAttack PoliticsMatters	(ECPR Press, 2015,with
Annemarie S. Walter) and	Election Watchdogs	(Oxford University Press, 2017, with Pippa Norris). He
is currently Associated Editor of the Journal of Social and Political Psychology.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 278–296 291
Ferran Martínez i Coma is Lecturer at the Center for Governance and Public Policy, Griffith Univer-
sity. Previously he was Senior Research Associate at the Electoral Integrity Project at the University of
Sydney. His research has focused on electoral behaviour, electoral integrity, and political parties. He
has published, among others, in Electoral Studies, Party Politics,West European Politics, Government
and Opposition, Presidential Studies Quarterly and the European Journal of Political Research.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 278–296 292
Appendix
Table A1. List of referenda between 1999 and 2012 at the Swiss federal level.
Ref. Referendum issue Date voted Type Percentage SRG
ID of ads with survey
attacks available?
661 Federal Council membership eligibility 07.02.1999 Compulsory referendum 0.00 No
662 House ownership for everyone 07.02.1999 Initiative 0.34 No
663 Spatial planning law amendment 07.02.1999 Optional referendum 0.00 No
664 Organ transplantation regulations 07.02.1999 Compulsory referendum No ads No
671 New Swiss constitution 18.04.1999 Compulsory referendum 0.10 No
681 Asylum law 13.06.1999 Optional referendum 0.05 No
682 Federal resolution on foreigners and asylum 13.06.1999 Optional referendum 0.05 No
683 Medical prescription of heroin 13.06.1999 Optional referendum 0.00 No
684 Federal law on disability insurance 13.06.1999 Optional referendum 0.00 No
685 Federal law on maternity insurance 13.06.1999 Optional referendum 0.32 Yes
691 Judicial reform 12.03.2000 Compulsory referendum 0.00 No
692 Speeding up direct democracy 12.03.2000 Initiative 0.22 No
693 Women in federal authorities 12.03.2000 Initiative 0.00 No
694 Procreation technology 12.03.2000 Initiative 0.00 No
695 Halving motorised road traffic 12.03.2000 Initiative 0.12 No
701 Sectoral agreements with the EU 21.05.2000 Optional referendum 0.12 No
711 Promoting solar energy 24.09.2000 Initiative 0.00 Wave 1 only
712 Counter-proposal on solar energy 24.09.2000 Counter-proposal 0.00 Wave 1 only
713 Tax contribution for energy efficiency 24.09.2000 Compulsory referendum 0.00 Wave 1 only
714 Regulating immigration 24.09.2000 Initiative 0.27 Yes
715 Referendums with counter-proposals 24.09.2000 Initiative 0.00 No
721 Retirement age for women 26.11.2000 Initiative 0.13 No
722 Flexible retirement age 26.11.2000 Initiative 0.16 No
723 Economising on military and defence 26.11.2000 Initiative 0.02 No
724 Lower hospital expenses 26.11.2000 Initiative 0.20 No
725 Law on federal employees 26.11.2000 Optional referendum 0.00 No
731 European Union membership 04.03.2001 Initiative 0.07 Yes
732 Lower medicine prices 04.03.2001 Initiative 0.11 No
731 European Union membership 04.03.2001 Initiative 0.07 Yes
732 Lower medicine prices 04.03.2001 Initiative 0.11 No
733 Urban speed limit of 30	km/h 04.03.2001 Initiative 0.03 No
741 Federal law on the military amendment (1) 10.06.2001 Optional referendum 0.26 Yes
742 Federal law on the military amendment (2) 10.06.2001 Optional referendum 0.26 Yes
743 Abolishing permits for creating diocese 10.06.2001 Compulsory referendum 0.00 No
751 Federal resolution on expenditure 02.12.2001 Compulsory referendum 0.00 No
752 For an assured Aged and Bereaved insurance 02.12.2001 Initiative 0.05 No
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Table A1. (Cont.) List of referenda between 1999 and 2012 at the Swiss federal level.
Ref. Referendum issue Date voted Type Percentage SRG
ID of ads with survey
attacks available?
753 For an authentic security policy 02.12.2001 Initiative 0.16 No
754 Solidarity creates security 02.12.2001 Initiative 0.15 No
755 For a capital gains tax 02.12.2001 Initiative 0.08 No
761 United Nations membership 03.03.2002 Initiative 0.17 Yes
762 Reducing working hours 03.03.2002 Initiative 0.06 No
771 Amendment on abortion 02.06.2002 Optional referendum 0.00 Yes
772 Restricting abortion 02.06.2002 Initiative 0.17 Yes
781 Surplus gold reserves into pension fund 22.09.2002 Initiative 0.02 Yes
782 Counter-proposal on gold reserves 22.09.2002 Counter-proposal 0.00 Yes
783 Electricity market law 22.09.2002 Optional referendum 0.02 No
791 Restricting asylum policies 24.11.2002 Initiative 0.26 Yes
792 Federal law on unemployment insurance 24.11.2002 Optional referendum 0.05 No
801 Referendum process 09.02.2003 Compulsory referendum 0.00 No
802 Cantonal contribution to hospital medicine 09.02.2003 Optional referendum 0.00 No
811 Federal law on the army 18.05.2003 Optional referendum 0.06 No
812 Federal law on civil defence 18.05.2003 Optional referendum 0.08 No
813 Motor vehicle-free Sundays 18.05.2003 Initiative 0.03 No
814 Affordable healthcare 18.05.2003 Initiative 0.05 Yes
815 Equal rights for the disabled 18.05.2003 Initiative 0.00 No
816 Fair rents 18.05.2003 Initiative 0.07 No
817 Electricity without nuclear power 18.05.2003 Initiative 0.20 No
818 Ban on new nuclear power plants 18.05.2003 Initiative 0.20 No
819 Provision of vocational education 18.05.2003 Initiative 0.00 No
821 Counter-proposals to motorway initiative 08.02.2004 Counter-proposal 0.13 Yes
822 Amendment to the Obligations (tenancy) law 08.02.2004 Optional referendum 0.06 No
823 Life sentences for dangerous criminals 08.02.2004 Initiative 0.00 No
831 Amending the Aged and Bereaved insurance 16.05.2004 Optional referendum 0.03 No
law
832 Financing of Aged and Bereaved insurance 16.05.2004 Compulsory referendum 0.00 No
833 Federal law on taxation 16.05.2004 Optional referendum 0.07 No
841 Federal resolution on naturalisation 26.09.2004 Compulsory referendum 0.03 Yes
842 Citizenship rights of third-generation 26.09.2004 Compulsory referendum 0.02 Yes
immigrants
843 Compensation for members of the armed 26.09.2004 Optional referendum 0.00 Yes
forces
844 Postal services for all 26.09.2004 Initiative 0.00 No
851 Federal and cantonal financial duties 28.11.2004 Compulsory referendum 0.00 Yes
852 Constitutional reordering of the federal 28.11.2004 Compulsory referendum No ads No
budget
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Ref. Referendum issue Date voted Type Percentage SRG
ID of ads with survey
attacks available?
853 Stem cell research law 28.11.2004 Optional referendum 0.00 Yes
871 Schengen/Dublin Agreement 05.06.2005 Optional referendum 0.13 Yes
872 Registered partnerships 05.06.2005 Optional referendum 0.00 Wave 1 only
881 Agreement on free movement of persons 25.09.2005 Optional referendum 0.16 Yes
891 Genetically modified food 27.11.2005 Compulsory referendum 0.00 Yes
892 Labour law 27.11.2005 Optional referendum 0.00 Yes
901 Constitutional amendment on education 21.05.2006 Compulsory referendum No ads No
911 Swiss National Bank profits 24.09.2006 Initiative 0.06 Yes
912 Amendment to the foreigners law 24.09.2006 Optional referendum 0.09 Yes
913 Amendment to the asylum law 24.09.2006 Optional referendum 0.08 Yes
921 Law on assistance for eastern Europe 26.11.2006 Optional referendum 0.10 Yes
922 Amendment to the family allowances law 26.11.2006 Optional referendum 0.04 Yes
931 For a Social Unified Health Insurance 11.03.2007 Initiative 0.07 Yes
941 Disability law amendment 17.06.2007 Optional referendum 0.01 Yes
951 Against fighter aircraft noise in tourism 24.02.2008 Initiative 0.00 Wave 1 only
areas
952 Business tax reform 24.02.2008 Optional referendum 0.04 Wave 1 only
961 For democratic naturalisation 01.06.2008 Initiative 0.44 Yes
962 Against government run information 01.06.2008 Initiative 0.88 Yes
campaigns
963 Counter-proposal on health insurance 01.06.2008 Counter-proposal 0.10 Yes
971 Pornographic crimes against children 30.11.2008 Initiative 0.00 No
972 Flexible state pension age 30.11.2008 Initiative 0.09 Yes
973 Restriction of the right of associations to 30.11.2008 Initiative 0.04 Yes
appeal against building projects
974 Legalisation of the personal consumption 30.11.2008 Initiative 0.03 Yes
and production of cannabis
975 Revision of the federal statute on narcotics 30.11.2008 Optional referendum 0.05 Yes
981 Extending freedom of movement for 08.02.2009 Optional referendum 0.08 Yes
workers in EU to Bulgaria and Romania
991 Future with complementary medicine 17.05.2009 Counter-proposal 0.00 Yes
992 Introduction of biometric passports 17.05.2009 Optional referendum 0.00 Yes
1001 Limited increase of VAT to continue 27.09.2009 Compulsory referendum 0.02 Yes
financing the Disability Insurance
1002 Decision not to introduce public initiatives 27.09.2009 Compulsory referendum No ads Yes
1011 Aviation fuel taxation 29.11.2009 Compulsory referendum 0.00 Yes
1012 Ban on exporting war supplies 29.11.2009 Initiative 0.00 Yes
1013 Ban on the construction of new minarets 29.11.2009 Initiative 0.20 Yes
1021 Amendment to the constitution on 07.03.2010 Compulsory referendum No ads Wave 1 only
research on humans
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Ref. Referendum issue Date voted Type Percentage SRG
ID of ads with survey
attacks available?
1022 Providing enhanced legal protection for 07.03.2010 Initiative 0.06 Wave 1 only
animals
1023 Change in minimum conversion rate for 07.03.2010 Optional referendum 0.15 Wave 1 only
occupational/disability pension plans
1031 Revision of unemployment benefits 26.09.2010 Optional referendum 0.09 Yes
1041 For the deportation of criminal foreigners 28.11.2010 Initiative 0.00 Yes
1042 Counter-proposal to the initiative for the 28.11.2010 Counter-proposal 0.15 Yes
deportation of criminal foreigners
1043 Taxation justice initiative 28.11.2010 Initiative 0.20 Yes
1051 For the protection against gun violence 13.02.2011 Initiative 0.15 Yes
1061 For an end to the limitless construction of 11.03.2012 Initiative 0.04 Yes
second homes
1062 For tax-supported building society savings 11.03.2012 Initiative 0.00 Yes
to buy living space for self-use
1063 Six weeks of vacation for everyone 11.03.2012 Initiative 0.00 Yes
1064 State earnings from gambling to be used for 11.03.2012 Compulsory referendum 0.00 Yes
the public interest
1065 Re-introduction of the Fixed Book Price 11.03.2012 Optional referendum 0.00 Yes
Agreement
1071 For assistance with savings for home buyers 17.06.2012 Initiative 0.01 Yes
1072 For strengthening popular rights on 17.06.2012 Initiative 0.00 Yes
foreign policy
1073 Reform of healthcare legislation 17.06.2012 Optional referendum 0.00 Yes
1081 Counter-project to initiative “youth 23.09.2012 Counter-proposal 0.00 Yes
and music”
1082 Secure housing in old age 23.09.2012 Initiative 0.03 Yes
1083 Smoking ban referendum 23.09.2012 Initiative 0.06 Yes
1091 Swiss Animal Diseases Act 25.11.2012 Optional referendum 0.00 No
Notes: Referenda excluded from all analyses if SRG survey data missing, and from some analyses if only wave 1 is available. Source:
authors’ own data (share of negative ads) and Gfs.bern data (pre-election polls).
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